Remy Cointreau Unsp/Adr

Good morning, everyone, and thank you for being with us this morning for Rémi Cointreau's full year results. I am here with Eric Valla, our CEO, and Luca Marotta, our CFO. Both of them will, of course, take you through the detailed results. As we present today our full year results, I would like to open with a few words of perspective. The past year has been marked by a complex and rapidly evolving environment, macroeconomic volatility, geopolitical tensions and temporary shifting consumer behaviour, all of which are more cyclical than structural and closely tied to a context of constrained spending. Yet, in the face of these headwinds, we remained true to our long-term vision, building exceptional brands, preserving our unique terroirs, and enhancing the desirability of our portfolio. But let us not forget, cognac has always evolved in long cycles. This is neither the first time nor the last. All the historic cognac families will tell you how it is important to stay the course during more difficult times. It is an essential condition for creating value over time. At Rémi Cointreau, we remain fully confident in the strength and relevance of our long-term strategy. Drink less but better is not a reaction, it is a conviction. Moderation is a structural trend, not a new one, and our value-driven model is built to embrace it. At Rémy Cointreau, we do not chase volume at any cost. This has been our stance for many decades and is one of Rémy Martin's greatest strengths. It is also what enables Louis XIII to stand the test of time, crossing centuries without losing its essence. We are tackling this challenging period with determination while also taking time for introspection. Both are essential. confronting the crisis, and at the same time, reflecting on how we can improve and emerge stronger. With that in mind, I would like to take this opportunity to sincerely thank all of Rémi Cointreau's teams for their perseverance and daily efforts, always carried out with the same passion. The upcoming CEO transition will mark a new chapter, one of renewed energy and continued strategic focus. We are delighted to welcome Franck-Marie Lee in a few weeks. His extensive experience in developing high-end international brands, his successful track record in business transformation and his proven ability to innovate and accelerate brands will be key assets that enable him to meet the challenges ahead. Our fundamentals are strong and our ambition remains unchanged to create sustainable value through excellence, discipline and long-term thinking. I will now let Eric take you to the full year business review. Eric, the floor is yours.

Thank you, Marie-Amélie, and good morning, everyone. Thank you for joining us today. I will begin with a quick overview of full year 24-25. Luca will then detail our financial results, and I will conclude by giving you an update of the group situation and the outlook as usual. Let's begin with a review of our business performance for the year. I am now on slide five. Group sales reached 984.6 million, representing an 18% organic decline. While this reflects the broader macroeconomic challenges, we took proactive steps to partially mitigate the impact by reducing costs, optimizing our operations, and enhancing efficiency. As a result, COP stood at 217 million, down 13.5% on an organic basis. Despite the sharp decline in sales, the organic COP margin reached the high end of our guidance range, standing at 21.6%. This represents a deterioration of 3.9 points organically. Beyond the sharp decrease in sales, this performance was mostly driven by two factors. One, the gross margin, while it declined by one point, primarily due to cost production, inflation, and a negative price mix effect, it remains at a high level, standing at 70.6%, which means 2.8 points versus 19-20. This demonstrates the structural strength of our business model despite the challenging environment. And two, ANP expenses were reduced by 1.1 point versus last year, now accounting for 20.3% of sales, reflecting a more targeted and efficient approach to brand investments. We have obviously taken measures in the current tough context, making sure we keep the right balance. Following several years of acceleration, ENP is posing, but from a high level. I am now moving on to slide six. The purpose of this slide and the following ones is to share some key achievements and to analyze our relative performance versus peers, looking at it for our key brands beyond the group results, which have been hugely impacted by our strong exposure to Cognac in the past two years. Let's start with Cognac, where we pride ourselves of having maintained our market shares worldwide despite a rather poor performance overall and a firm pricing policy in a challenging context. This inspires me three main high-level comments. First, Rémy Martin is a strong brand with a relevant positioning and its relative performance has been driven by the smart use of new channels like e-commerce, particularly in China. Second, a good share of the headwinds Cognac is facing are cyclical, as already explained and detailed by our peers. Third, we shall not deny that Cognac as a category is facing challenges in the US, while remaining very aspirational. We need to recruit beyond our existing core clientele, and we will achieve such through product innovation and new campaigns. Cointreau has benefited full speed from a wise and thoughtful investment behind the Margarita to leverage the growth of cocktails in the US and worldwide. It has gained market shares, but the opportunity remains massive. We have a great liquid and we are working on innovation to target new moments of consumption for the brand, particularly day occasions versus a strong focus today on the evening and the night. We could have shared the results of the Botanist as well, which are even more striking, even though from a much lower base, of course. The Botanist is the brand which benefited the most from the portfolio strategy beyond Cognac, and it is now accretive for the group from a gross margin standpoint. Moving to slide 7 and a crucial market, the U.S., Over the past two years, our company faced significant challenges which have strongly impacted our performance. But our recent performance seems to indicate that we have finally reached the bottom and we believe this difficult phase is now behind us. From that low point, we have begun to rebound and recent results show a clear recovery momentum throughout the year. Our key indicators are trending upward, confirming that the worst is past and that our strategic actions are starting to pay off. Throughout the downturn, we remained disciplined and focused on long-term strength. We maintained a rational pricing policy, refusing to engage in desperate price cuts just to chase short-term volume. Despite this prudent approach, we have been steadily narrowing the gap with our competitors, as demonstrated by the two charts on the right. In other words, our strategy proves to be relevant. We are regaining ground in the market without compromising our margins or the premium value of our products. This combination of pricing discipline and competitive focus is positioning us for sustainable improvement as the market recovers. And our latest survey, which measures our brand's desirability, strongly supports this conviction. Rémy Martin is still the number two within the cognac category. Moreover, we have made a substantial effort to reduce our inventory, particularly last year, with the destocking evaluated at 60 million euros. Today, we can confidently state that the absolute value of our stock level is now significantly lower than it was in 1920. This is why we consider that we enter the new fiscal year. with stronger fundamentals and we are reasonably confident that this positive momentum will continue in the coming months. Having said that, we are still waiting for the spark in depletions mentioned by Luca in previous mails. It would trigger the full speed recovery as our stocks, which are low in absolute value, would all of a sudden appear too low in a number of months. But we are not there yet, to be clear. I am now on slide 8. China has been and by far the country where we outperformed the most. EXO has gained market shares but starting from a very low base and below our expectations. Our activations have been hit by the current macroeconomic context and its impact on the high end. On the other hand, Club gained 4 points of market shares in its own segment. An amazing performance in five years. This has been driven by the liquid and the iconic shape of the bottle, which fits perfectly Chinese taste and symbols. And it has been amplified massively by a very smart and intense packaging animation and e-commerce roadmap. This has been made possible thanks to the decision we took four years ago to drive part of product innovation directly in China and thanks to the strengthening of the e-commerce team over time with a very entrepreneurial mindset. Talking about e-commerce, we managed to grow 12% last year and have now reached and secured the number one position among imported spirits, far behind Baidu. One last word on the desirability of Rémy Martin in China. As part of our last survey, one output is that cognac remains a very attractive category. It is in the top three most desirable premium spirits categories, and Rémy Martin remains the solid number two cognac brand since 2020. Another important achievement, and I am now on page nine, is this challenging environment has been the in-depth work we have done on cost to mitigate the impact of the top line on profitability. Over the past two years, we have implemented a series of targeted measures to address this issue. In 23, 24 fiscal year, we achieved savings of 145 million This year, or last year, 24-25, we continued our efforts, reaching 85 million in savings. In total, this amounts to 230 million saved over two years. Focusing on structural savings only, we have made significant progress in reducing our total cost base by 12% compared to two years ago. In addition to these cost reductions, we have also taken a gradual and considered approach to optimizing our workforce. Rather than making bold restructuring announcements, we have carefully managed our headcount reduction step by step, ensuring sustainability and minimizing disruption. Overall, we managed to reduce our total headcount by 9% compared to 22-23 at the peak, while taking the decision to reinforce our organization where we believe there is potential, notably in China beyond Guangdong, for instance, but I will get back to it later. Let me now highlight our progress on sustainability on slide 10. In 24-25, Rémi Cointreau made significant headway on the sustainable exception. Our transformation roadmap structured around three pillars, people, terroir, and time. This year, terroir stood out with visible and measurable impact. We achieved an A rating from CDP, Carbon Disclosure Project, Climate, and a B- from CDP water, reflecting external recognition. Carbon emissions were down 12% versus 2021, our reference baseline, keeping us firmly on track to meet our 2030 SBTI targets. While reduced production volumes played a role, the results also reflect key drivers included operational improvements and supplier engagement especially on packaging leading to a 23% cut in emissions per bottle. All our new packaging are now eco-designed. We aim to reach the lightest weight possible and use only CSR-friendly materials. Transport-related emissions were also reduced by 18% per bottle transported. We also made major strides on water use. Net water consumption fell by 53% versus 22-23, which is massive, equivalent to a 39% drop per bottle produced. These savings came from a robust program across the value chain, including better water treatment, leak management and rainwater harvesting. Finally, in Cognac, we launched the Centre Pact, a bold step in favour of agroecology. By March 25, over 42% of our wine-growing partners had already been trained in sustainable practices. I am now done with my first part, coming back to last year, and I will now give the mic to Luca, who will be more specific on financials.

Thank you, Eric. Now let's move on to a detailed analysis of the financial statement. Let's start with the full-year income statement, P&L. As previously mentioned, organic sales were down 18%. Based on this, gross profit decreased by 19.2 in organic terms, implying one point less, so deterioration in gross margin. though these still represent a strong improvement of 2.8 to 180 basis points on a five-year period. This full-year performance reflects an unfathomable evolution in COGS, as well as a negative price-mix effect, of which pricing contribution was slightly negative as expected. Sales and marketing expenses were down 16% organically, While we have reduced some investment in the current context, spending remains in line with pre-COVID levels. Inside, within this total, we have two splits in two different souls. AMP expenses were down 22.3 organically, still representing more than 20%. 20.3 percent of sales, so an increase organically of 2.4 points over a five-year period. As part of our optimization efforts, we increased the share of below-the-line specific point-of-sale spending relative to the above-the-line more general brand awareness spending during this period. So as a consequence, the below-the-line investment share, POS advertising, animation, activation, more volume-oriented promotional activities, is now bigger to the above-the-line spending. So what is above the line? Traditional media, digital, and PR. This is also there to speed up at the maximum depletion, the best approach of sell-out. Additionally, digital represented 60%, more or less two-thirds, of the above the line. So we can say that digitally, the group is spending 30% of the total AMP in digital. Then there is another line, which is the distribution cost, decreased by 6.2% organically year-on-year, mainly due to the restructuring efforts made in the U.S. and Europe last year, which are now as guided as expected, generating savings this year. The year just ended in 24-25. Over a more wide period, over a five-year period, these distribution costs are now down 11.3% in absolute terms. So what does it mean? That distribution costs have been decreased two times faster than top-line decrease. Then there's a third line, administrative expenses. We are down 2.5% on our organic brazes year on year. reflecting a series of overhead cost optimization in response in answer to the current economic condition, which I will detail shortly. Over a longer five-year period, this cost increased by 13.7, reflecting two different dynamics. Decrease, strong decrease in holding costs, but a bigger increase than that in marketing and staff costs behind essentially several future growth-oriented brands that today are strong investment, but with the top line, which is not yet at the point we expected. Overall, the current operating profit is now down, was down 30.5% organically, as Eric pointed out, and 28.7 on a reported basis. So small benefit on Forex. Important to notice this year because this next year will be another story as you have seen. After accounting for a positive currency impact of plus 5.6 million euro. Operating profit margins stood at 22%. down 3.5 points as reported, and down 3.9 points organically. The sharp decrease in sales alongside the clean and gross margin were partially offset, but not totally, but additional cost reduction. Now, let's take a look at the group current operating margin bridge, slide number 13. It was down, as said, 3.5 points as reported, reaching 22%. This breaks down into an organic decrease of 3.9 and a positive currency effect of 4. But why 3.9 points of decrease? First of all, deterioration of the gross margin, which remains at a high level of 70.6 and clearly above 1920 to 1980 base points. This was partially offset by a reduction in AMP spend which remain at a level still bigger, significantly bigger and higher than pre-COVID level, along with the further optimization in distribution and structural costs accumulated. In more detail, gross margin was down one point, impacted by inflation and COGS and unfavorable price mix effect. Pricing was slightly negative over the period, reflecting the slight adjustment made in Cognac, particularly on VSOP, as well as a more pragmatic approach, more volume-oriented, on Lycos and Spirits brand pricing. AMP ratio decreased by 1.1, primarily due to the optimization efforts, such as prioritizing BTL spending over above the line. And while we have made this cut, the reduction is relatively modest compared to the significant acceleration in spending over the past year. So IMP still remain far bigger, I insist on that, of 240 base point versus 1920. Third, which is the negative factor on this specific year, is the ratio of distribution structure cost that was up four points, even if decreased by 13.4 million in absolute terms, reflecting savings related to reorganization project of last year, coupled with further cost control effort to mitigate the impact of the sharp sales decline. Furthermore, this evolution of organic cob margin includes another round of cost saving, totaling more than guided. We gathered 450. Now we totaled 85 this year, which I will detail in the next slide. Slide number 14. In October 24, we announced, beyond stimulating our sales performance, that we decided to mitigate as much as possible the impact of these headwinds in top line with a very pragmatic, specific, tailor-made approach on cost, targeting more than 50 million cost savings. Thanks to a very good, quite excellent execution of this plan, We overachieved once again this objective and reached 85 million on a full year basis, of which 75% to three-fourths of structural savings that will last. In parallel, 25% of total savings are one-off, and so they will automatically reverse in 2025-2026 P&L. What we have done? Let's start with manufacturing and logistics, which contribute to 5% of total savings. All of them are structural. They will last forever. And reflects on lasting effort, optimization, and production in Europe. Second, on AMP, which represented around 65% of total savings, and this includes 20% of one-off savings spread across the globe, mainly in the cognate division, with, of course, a bit more emphasis on a depressed U.S. market. Here, the objective, I insist, was to protect more BTL, point of sales, volume-oriented, depletion-oriented spending, and be more selective this time, this year, on above-the-line and brand awareness-oriented expenses. So we had 80% as a second factor inside the MP of structural saving, which correspond to additional investment made over the past three, four years, and that will return now to a more normalized level relative to sales. If depletion and top line give signs of dynamism, clearly we might re-accelerate because of the variable nature of this spending. But as a global comment, the level of 20% we reached is quite satisfying, more than enough to dynamize the actual top line. Third point, overheads. Represented around 30%, so the missing part of total saving. Mostly 50-50, 45% one-off, including saving linked to the variable compensation benefit, travel and expenses, and fees cut, and more structural saving, 55%, integrated the optimization made in our organization, the organization in the US and Europe. All in all, the exceeding saving, 35 million, that we are now analyzing compared to the guidance, are mainly coming from what? First, AMP, mainly structural savings, for 65%, quite logic. Top line at that time was not what they ended with, but more in the highest brackets, minus 15 to minus 18. We are at minus 18, so we adjusted. And overheads for 30%, equally split between short-term and long-term. That's not enough on saving. Looking back over the past two years, we made a total of 230 million euro in cumulative savings. Focusing only on structural saving, the one that at the end truly matters because are there to last and stand, they account for around 130 million euro or 55 percent of the total. What does it mean? a 12% reduction of our total cost base since 22-23. And as an additional note, headcount had been reduced without any major global worldwide reorganization, which is not our style, by 9% over the same period. So now let's move to the remaining part of the income statement, page number 15. After the operating profit, we had other operating income expenses that are showing a negative value of 6 million to be compared to minus 12.8 million last year. What is behind that value? Mainly the cost of restructuring operation in China that has been happened this year and that will help to mitigate the potential rising duties. As a result, operating profit came to $211 million into 2024-25, down 27.7% as reported. Financial charges increased, as expected, a little bit less than guided, if you want to point out, from 38.5 to 42.6. I will go into that with more detail on this next slide. The report tax rate increased from 27.4 last year to 28.6, mainly due to the additional charge related to the exceptional corporate tax contribution in France linked to the 2025 French finance law. But stripping out non-recurring items, the effective tax rate was 27.2 to be compared to 27.1 last year. So basically the same flat tax rate. At this stage, we expect a tax rate slightly above 425.26. around 29 percent, including the year two or 1.5 points of exceptional contribution linked to the French law of finance. As a result, bottom line net profit group share came in at 121.2 million euro, so minus 34.4 on a reported basis, so a net margin of 12.3 percent, down 3.2 point versus last year, but more or less flat versus 1920. Earning per share came out at 236, down 35.3, and minus 9 percent versus 1920. Excluding non-recurring items, clean EPS stood at 249 euro. Now, let's move to the analysis of the 6 million non-recurring items. Three components, 6 million net charges, which most include the cost of restructuring operation in China to help mitigate the potential rise in duties, plus 1.7 of positive non-recurring tax items linked to this charge, and 2.5 million euro negative or net charges related to the exceptional corporate tax contribution in France. Slide number 17, some comment, as already mentioned, on net financial expenses, which amounted to 42.6 million euro in 2024-25 compared to 38.5. Up 4.1 million, but better than our expectation, better than our guidance. Net debt servicing costs were up in absolute terms as a result of the 12-month integration of, if you remember, 380 million euro private bond issuance, which has an average of 10-year maturity, at a weighted interest rate of 5.58%. As a reminder, we issued this bond in September 2023. So as a consequence, also this pro-rata temporis effect, our cost of debt increased from 3.76 to 4.07. Net currency expenses decreased from a loss of 2 million last year to a loss of 1.3 million this year, primarily due to the hedging of intra-group intercompany financing. Last but not least, other financial expenses stood at 7.6 million in 2024-25. For the year 2025-2026, we expect our financial charges to increase at around €5,500,000. Now, let's analyze one of the most important slides for us, which is the free cash flow generation and the net debt evolution on page 18. Free cash flow increased from 13.8 to 19.2 million in 2024-2025, or from 18.2 to 27.6 if you want to exclude non-recurring items. This evolution reflects, on one hand, a significant, important decrease in EBITDA, offset by three major factors. First, sharp reduction in tax outflows from $88.4 million to $19.9 million, clearly reflecting a lower net result, so less taxes, and a tax cash reduction related to overpayment in previous years. The second factor I would like to highlight is the capex outflow, which decreased by 29.7 million euro, considering the cash protection and optimization measure that also in that field we implemented. Finally, total working capital, global working capital, while not being the main driver this year, shows early signs of long-term optimization. The outflow decreased by 12.4 million euro, including a decrease of 6.7 rate to the ODV and ageing spirit, and 5.7 reduction in other working capital outflows. Overall, so the evolution of this important indicator, total working capital, reflect a smaller increase in inventory compared to full year 2022-2024 in terms of finished goods, cognac, eau de vie, aged liquid and bulk, and raw materials and packaging elements, considering the current context. and a more important significant decrease of account receivables compared to full year 2022-2024. What does it mean? An inflow of 25.7 million euros offset by a decrease in payables in line with a sharp slowdown in activity. In parallel, other cash outflows decreased by €81.9 million, largely due to the optimization of the cash dividend last year, €41 million versus €152.7 million. As a result, at the end of March 2025, Our net financial debt stood at 675.4, up 25.7 million euro from March 24. As a consequence, A ratio is up from 168 March 24 to 2.4 in March 25. Slide number 19, a new slide. Let's talk about the free cash flow conversion. which is very peculiar as an indicator for our industry, particularly for players like us heavily exposed to aging inventories. The analysis of this evolution highlights strong year-on-year volatility, primarily because it is driven by changes in EBITDA. During the peak positive periods, 2021 for instance, free cash flows conversion reached 45%, supported by the initial COVID-driven business boom and a measured, little bit delayed level of ODV purchases. Following year, 2022-21, free cash flow conversion stood at high level, but 24% driven by the record high EBITDA of the group during the COVID peak, but partially offset by the reinforcement of our future ODB supply coverage and our investment behind the future growth. So, we can say that our business, and for specific players like us with the weight of an aged business, our business model includes some inertia due to the two-day purchases being made to support future growth. A more, if you want, normalized level, excluding both the positive effect of COVID and the current adverse contest, would be in the range of 15% to 20% of free cash flow conversion. We are not there this year. We won't be there next year, 2025-2026, either if tariffs in China or the U.S. are confirmed. Clearly, there are two swords waving too much also on these indicators for 2025-2026. But it is a normalized environment with steady with the growth and continued optimization of cash behind our brands, ODB purchases and CAPEX, all the investment set up, this remains 15 to 20, a realistic normative target for the group. Now, let's move on the impact, a very technical slide, but it's important. More than ever necessary this year, in 25-26. Currency edges as slide number 20. The group reported this year, in 24-25, a positive translation impact of 5.7 million on sales, better than expected, and a positive transactional effect of 5.6 in COP in 24-25. This mainly reflects the evolution of U.S. dollar. So top line, bottom line, the same. So it is accretive. It is positive compared to the organic P&L. Let's look at our forecast for 2025-2026. We talked about that already at the end of April, but it's important to rehearse and repeat. Why? This is particularly tough to estimate considering the strong volatility of the U.S. dollar and more generally all the currencies this year. This year we have chosen to work on three scenarios on the U.S. dollar mainly and the RMB, Chinese Yuan currencies. which cover, combined, 85% of our hedging needs. So the best case scenario, 107 US dollar and 760 for the Chinese one. The second one, which is the current case scenario, which is presented, 115 for US dollar and 7075. And the worst case scenario, 125 or 810. Focusing clearly, as has been highlighted on the current case scenario, we assume a conversion rate of 1.15 euro-US dollar and 7.75 euro-RMB as well, this is conversion, as an edged rate of 1.12, so better than 1.15, on euro-US dollar and 70.82, like it was on Chinese one. So in absolute value, we anticipate the following negative impact between 30 and 35 million on sales, published sales compared to organic, mostly driven by a negative effect in H2 for two-thirds. between minus 10 and minus 15 on operating profit, equally split more or less between H1, H2. You can read all the information on the slide, talking also about forex sensitive by currency at year 11. As the evolution of the Euro-US dollar and to a lesser extent that is there of the Euro-RMB exchange rate remain very volatile, we will continue to update, to share with you in a very detailed Sometimes boring, but important for you to modelize also the published, even if we don't guide on published but organic. And so give you an update every quarter. At this stage, for 25-26, what we have done? We have already covered 80% of our estimated net U.S. dollar exposure, of which around 60% of option. On RMB, we already covered 60% of our net Chinese RMB exposure, of which around 50% 5-0 of option. Slide number 21, now let's move on the balance sheet overview, where total assets and liabilities stood at 3.42 billion, up 53 million compared to March 24. On the left side, the assets, global inventory increased by 133 million to reach 2.1 due to the purchase of young ODV and increase in our inventory levels given the current context. Inventories now represent 61% total assets, up three points, it was 58 last year. On the right side, on the liability side, shareholder equity is up by $84 million, historically high, mainly driven by the net income partially offset by the payment of the dividend related to the fiscal 2022-2024. The group's net-to-debt equity ratio, net gearing, is flat over the period at 35%. Always on the cash and return on investment side, let's move as every year at the ROCHI slide number 22. Our ratio came in at 10.3 in 24, 25, down, clearly down, 5.2 points on a reported basis, and 5.5 points in organic terms. This includes an organic decrease of 5.5 in Roche of the group brands and the negative swing, as you can see, even if it's a minor absolute value in partner brands Roche. Why that? The Roche evolution is the result of an asymmetry between organic increase of 7.6% in employed capital and a strong decline of 30.5% in COP, as the group continues to invest for the future despite a challenging context over the short term. This is particularly the case for our biggest division, Cognac One. Its ROCI declined 6.3% organically to 10.9%, on the back of an increase of 8% in employee capital and a CUP decline bigger than 30%, 32.4%. In 2024-2025, the group continued to invest in aging inventory, slightly less than before, but still investing, and CapEx sticking to its long-term strategy. Other divisions, so Laksa and Spirits, roughly decreased by 2.3 points, organically to reach 12.4%. bigger than Cognac. This evolution reflects a continued investment behind our brands, with employee capital being up 6.2 organically, alongside a decrease of 10.5 income. One word on employee capital, more closely is line number 23. So overall amount increased by 152.3 million, but the organic part, which is the important part, is 148.9, and a positive currency impact of 3.5. On the organic side, so we show you the 7.6 year-on-year increase in employee capital, reflecting a strong increase in aging inventories, 74% of the growth. In capex, less than 10%, so sign of strong moderation, without giving up the strategic view, as explained earlier on other inventories. Now, last word, slide 24 from my side. Moving to the early dividend, given the short-term headwinds and our confidence for the coming years, an ordinary dividend of 1.5 per share will be submitted for shareholder approval at the General Assembly on 22nd of July 2025. One year will be proposed in cash and 0.5 with the option of payment in cash or shares. Overall, total dividend equates to a payout of 60%. based on a recurring APS of 249 and a yield of 2.22% on the average share price over the fiscal year, which was 67.35. I'm done. Thank you.